Archiv für Juli 2009

Why ‚Onkel Otto‘ after left-radical Inventions ?

The political body on Intersectionality:

Sorry brothers and sisters of beer drunken ‚queer‘-dome…..this should be a short statement ‚about‘ in German best manners:

This is a short statement of ‚one‘ person who have sights on the Hamburgs left-radical scene………

Geschichte über einen Imago an ’sexualisiertem Grenzübertritt‘ einer wahrscheinlich vom Staatsschutz siechenden Person und anschließender Diffamierung ganzer Planbeispiele in dem anno 1997 ff. Jahre ‚bi-sexueller Promiskuität‘ mit ‚Trans‘ hier und ‚Koks‘ dort trallalalala, stimmt mich ganz belustigt und übel auf, da es hätte auch der Natur der ‚deutschen Sprach-Linken‘ nicht gefällt, wenn die Möglichkeiten zu politischer Selbstbestimmung im Feld gerade zu verortender Aphorismen und Psychogrammierung ins Hort der eigenen Interessen fällt – – – die der ‚ewigen‘ Party….

By the way: Hip Hop means Culture on stakenly gender, race and class colonial matters……

Darüber hinaus sollte es eigentlich ein Anliegen der linksradikalen Überbleibsel der damaligen Jahre gewesen sein, die Vermachtung von Subjektivierungsprozessen in Hinblick auf die Kategorie ‚Grenzübertritt‘ (diverser ‚maps‘) / Sexualität in ihrer Verwobenheit mit anderen Subjektivierungsweisen und Machtverhältnissen zu erfassen. Insofern ist die ganze Theorie-bildung für mich als Mensch nur eine spezifische Perspektive auf (Identitäts-)kategorien, die sich – obwohl eng damit verknüpft – nicht auf identitätspolitische Fragen reduzieren lässt.

Die Privilegierung der Kategorie im Rechtsstreit und an der Universität in den Theorienbildungen ist bedingt durch den Entstehungskontext von ‚Betroffenheit‘ und ‚mal wollen/möchten usw. usf…

Aber entscheidend ist für mich, dass die monatlich stattfindenden Events im ‚Onkel Otto‘ und/oder ‚Hafenklang‘ zeichen-theoretisch Überlegungen mit den psycho-analytischen Begriffen der Phantasie und der affektiven Besetzung verknüpft, so dass Letztere als Prozesse der Repräsentation und Selbstrepräsentation verstanden werden können und ’szene-politische Egalität‘ zeugt.
In der Ausdeutung der Phantasien in Form von Repräsentationen, auch mal gern im ‚anti-nationalem Sinn‘ „Fetische“ bezeichnet, entsteht der Kontakt oder die Vermittlung zwischen Innenwelt und Außenwelt, die die Konstituierung des psycho-sozio-sexuellen Subjekts und dessen Einbindung in soziale Beziehungen und gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse bedingt. Die affektive oder libidinöse Besetzung einer Phantasie oder Repräsentation, also deren Verknüpfung mit einer psychischen Energie, die diese Form der bisherigen Auseinandersetzung als Stückwerk eben erstrebenswert (positiv) oder als zu vermeiden (negativ) kennzeichnet, ist für mich zugleich ein Prozess, mittels dem Normen auf Körper projiziert werden.

Bel

P.S. Die Initiatoren der vermeintlichen Vergewaltigungsdebatte sind mir soweit bekannt!

Chaotenzentrale - Deine Punk-Community aus dem Hause Nix Gut

Each last Sat in month at ‚Onkel Otto‘ – Hafenstraße

Imag(in)ing Place Britcore-Hip Hop at it finest:

01 This event had its genesis in a deliberate misreading of a conference call for music. Hip Hop had been working on what the mass called „place-making imagination,“ when it was told about a joint task asking for papers on „Imaging Place.“ Only two letters separated what I was doing from what was required – Imaging Place easily becomes „Imagining Place“ and hypostatizes into „Place-Making Imagination.“ Imagination produces images, I thought, and is comprised of them, and so the misreading is slight at best. I should be able to make things fit easily enough.

02 But that slight adjustment hides something more interesting. This small addition, this interruption into imaging, may suggest more than is immediately apparent. „In,“ as a preposition, suggests a move toward the center, a move „inward.“ If we are in the room, we are bounded by the walls; if we are part of the „in“ group, we are not, at least, on the outs; if we are „in love“ we are perhaps dominated and infused by love. But „in“ as a prefix, that’s different—it is „in“discreet, „in“temperate and possibly even „in“hospitable. In other words, while the preposition „in“ moves inward, the prefix „in“ negates, even moves outward. „Intemperate“ suggests a move away from a civilized and balanced center. „Interminable“ suggests a move beyond temporal boundaries, if not outside of one’s patience. In, in short, inscribes a tension. Inserted into a word, we don‘t quite know whether it is intentional, a verbal interloper, or even at all interesting. But there could hardly be a better word to start with, when place is concerned.

03 Is this all just word play? After Derrida, how can it „just“ be word play anymore, and anyway, why is play such a bad thing? And yet, the word play always moves us toward something else, something that allows a little light to shine in, if that does not suggest a little too much metaphysics of presence. It is worth remembering that the play is serious. „A man’s maturity,“ as Nietzsche said in Beyond Good and Evil, „that is to have rediscovered the seriousness he possessed as a child at play.“ This little word play, this slippage between „image“ and „imagine“ provides a starting point for thinking about place, how we understand it, how (or whether) it matters, and perhaps most importantly, what happens at the edges of incommensurable modes of place-making.

04 The image has a long history, of course. We might, following Aristotle in De Anima, equate it with the „phantasm,“ the ability to apprehend an immediate sensory experience and make a mental representation of it. For Aristotle, a phantasm based on sensation is something humans share with animals, while a phantasm based on reason is imagination. We might, of course, follow Augustine (in the latter half of On the Trinity, among other places) and connect the image with the source of all images, the „imago Dei,“ the image of God stamped on us. The image, then, classically, is a „phantasia.“ Now, of course, we think of „fantasy“ very differently, as a delusion or an alternative to reality. Imagination, on the other hand, is a resolutely human characteristic, a specific kind of image production. It enables us to assemble given contents of the mind into something new and makes available what is not yet present, and to do so in a manner that is not just inferential (the way one might expect the coming of a friend by an SMS sent ahead). We might also think of image and imagination as two sides of a coin, or more accurately, as the external and internal aspects of representation. The philosophical tradition running through Aristotle and Augustine, of course, doesn‘t make this distinction: if the image is the „phantasy“ and the imagination is a uniquely human characteristic, we have a difference of kind, not of degree.

05 So, far from merely seeing image and imagination as extensions of each other, related as product and mental faculty, there is good reason to see them as separate. At the very least, they are classically assigned to different beings with different capabilities. The point here is not to work out in any exhaustive way the Aristotelian understanding of the soul but rather to open the door to the possibility that what is usually taken as an obvious extension, between image and imagination, might in fact exist in some tension.

06 Image, imagine. Linked by the presence and absence of „in.“ Phantasy and imagination. Perhaps this is just playing with binary oppositions. But there will be more binaries to consider before we are done. Umberto Eco once said of the movie Casablanca that, „the clichés were having a ball“ (Eco). The movie succeeded, in other words, not because it avoided clichés but because it reveled in them. Perhaps the same can be true of binaries, those discredited products of Cartesian thought. In what follows, I want to explore two modes of place-making, one which we might refer to as „dwelling,“ that is, the memory and desire of imagination and the other which will be the „scene,“ that is, the exchange and interplay of image. Instead of denying binaries, I want to make the tension between the two productive.

Bel